Indigenous land claims in Europe: The European Court of Human Rights and the decolonization of property by Otis, Ghislain & Laurent, Aurélie
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Abstract: This study examines the potential impact of recent developments in 
international human rights law relating to indigenous land claims on the protec-
tion of property under the European Convention on Human Rights. In a depar-
ture from colonial law the authors show how the doctrine of ancestral indigenous 
land title has recently been incorporated into international human rights law. 
This development, however, has yet to occur within the regime of the European 
Convention. The authors argue that the new decolonized approach to property 
can and should be adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in its inter-
pretation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention.
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1. Introduction
The current challenge of recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples, originated 
in the heart of Europe as early as the 15th century. With the push towards world-
1. This is an English translation of an article first published in French in vol. 89 of the Revue 
trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (2012).
indigenous land claims in europe
157
wide colonial expansion the stage was set for the gradual emergence of indigenous 
claims as a key issue in international human rights law. With the development of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Europe has moved to ensure 
the international protection of fundamental rights, including those of individuals 
belonging to minorities. However, there has been little progress in the area of in-
digenous rights2 despite the fact that a number of communities have already been 
recognized by European states as “indigenous peoples”.3 This paper proposes an 
innovative approach to the ECHR with respect to the land rights of indigenous 
peoples still living under European sovereignty. It argues that the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) should take stock of the recent evolution of interna-
tional human rights law and interpret Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR, 
which guarantees property rights, as affording a more vigorous protection to in-
digenous land tenure than what has been the case so far.
Between the 15th and 20th centuries European powers employed various means 
to acquire sovereignty over vast territories on every continent. When establish-
ing their political and legal relationships with the indigenous peoples occupying 
those territories, the colonizing powers frequently drew on an ethnocentric and 
evolutionistic notion of international law that tended to legitimize their ambi-
tions of colonial domination. The most well-known of the colonial doctrines is 
undoubtedly that of “discovery”, which was used to justify unilateral assertions 
of sovereignty over peoples whose political, legal, and economic systems were 
deemed insufficiently developed to provide a basis for international sovereignty, 
a status reserved for “civilized” nations only.4 By the 19th century the internaliza-
tion of the status of indigenous peoples had become irresistible.5 Accordingly the 
2. One commentator, for example, refers to “Europe’s forgotten indigenous peoples”: Grote, 
Rainer, “On the Fringe of Europe: Europe’s Largely Forgotten Indigenous Peoples” in Am. 
Indian L. Rev, (31) 2006–2007 pp. 425–443. See also Koivurova, Timo, “Jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights Regarding Indigenous Peoples: Retrospect and Prospects” 
in International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, (18) 2011 pp. 1–37.
3. The Inuit of Greenland, the Saami people of Scandinavia and Russia, the indigenous small 
numbered peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East, and the Kanaks of New Caledonia, 
which the Nouméa Accord designates as “original people” and the “indigenous population”.
4. This doctrine was adapted from terra nullius, the theory of vacant and unoccupied land, as 
developed by Grotius. See Miller, Robert, Native America, discovered and conquered: Thomas 
Jefferson, Lewis & Clark, and Manifest Destiny, Bison Books, University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln NE 2008 at pp. 9–24; Morin, Michel, L’usurpation de la souveraineté autochtone, 
Boréal, Montréal 1997 at pp. 163–182.
5. Internalization should be understood as the gradual transfer of relations with indigenous peo-
ples from the area of international law to that of domestic law. See Schulte-Tenckhoff, Isabelle, 
La question des peuples autochtones, Bruylant, L.G.D.J., Bruxelles, Paris 1997 at p. 169.
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issue of indigenous peoples’ rights over the lands they traditionally occupied and 
used pursuant to their customary systems was relegated exclusively to the sphere 
of domestic law. Under colonial logic, indigenous peoples were then and now at 
the mercy of the power of the state and its often racist policies.
Through the internalization of the indigenous issue, public domain law became 
a powerful tool in the exercise of a state’s control over the lands of the first occu-
pants. Many national legal systems, but not all, applied the principle of eminent 
domain – a presumption of state monopoly over land – to indigenous territories 
on the grounds that no legal title of ownership existed over those lands.6 In this 
way, states became the lawful owners of lands traditionally occupied and used 
by indigenous peoples but nevertheless deemed to be “vacant and unoccupied”, 
which the government could therefore grant or allocate to third parties without 
resorting to expropriation. Their ancestral customary tenure thus disregarded, 
indigenous peoples could now only hold derived land rights granted by the state 
or acquired by conveyance or prescription. The state’s law became the only formal 
source of rights over land and resources, even where this law took into account the 
fact of ancestral occupation as a cultural, economic, or political justification for 
rights granted to indigenous peoples under the official legal system. Indeed, this 
is still the case today in the domestic laws of European states where indigenous 
claims exist.7
Indigenous peoples have not rested, however, in their efforts to challenge the 
discriminatory premises of colonial law. In Europe as elsewhere indigenous land 
claims are frequently based on the assertion that, by the time of European colo-
nization, native populations had already appropriated land and resources in ac-
6. See Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 53th Sess., Indigenous Peoples and their 
Relationship to Land – Final working paper prepared by the Special Rapporteur Mrs. Erica-
Irene A. Daes, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21.
7. See, for example, the regimes in force in Russia, Scandinavia, and the French Overseas 
Territories: Fondahl, Gail & Poelzer, Greg, “Aboriginal Land Rights in Russia at the Beginning 
of the Twenty-first Century” in Polar Record, (39) 2003 pp. 111–122; Baer, Lars-Anders, “The 
Rights of Indigenous People – A Brief Introduction in the Context of the Sami” in International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights, (12) 2005 pp. 245–267. Finnmark Act (Act of 17 June 
2005 nr 85: Lov om rettsforhold og forvaltning av grunn og naturressurser i Finnmark fylke).
(Norway), available in English at http://www.galdu.org/web/index.php?sladja=51&vuolitslad
ja=97&giella1=eng; Lafargue, Régis, La coutume face à son destin. Réflexions sur la coutume 
judiciaire en Nouvelle-Calédonie et la résilience des ordres juridiques infra-étatiques, L.G.D.J., 
Paris 2010 at pp. 228–230; Tiouka, Alexis & Karpe, Philippe, “Droits des peuples autochtones 
à la terre et au patrimoine” in ATBA, Revue d’ethnobiologie, (40) 2008 pp. 611–632.
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cordance with their own cultures and legal systems.8 Possession from pre-colonial 
times under an indigenous legal tradition forms the basis for claims that the an-
cestral indigenous customary title has survived the colonial state’s acquisition of 
sovereignty, and is still legally effective where indigenous peoples have continued 
to exist as distinct ethnocultural groups with a connection to their traditional 
lands. Thus, such indigenous claims concern primarily ancestral land rights, which 
contemporary indigenous peoples hold not through an allocation by the state but 
by virtue of a pre-colonial legal order. As such, they are claimed as pre-existing 
rights to be recognized by the state, not created or granted.
The distinctive legal nature of indigenous land rights is reflected in interna-
tional instruments specifically designed to affirm the rights of indigenous peoples, 
such as the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (Convention No. 169)9 of the 
International Labour Organization (I.L.O) and the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2007.10 
That said, few European states have ratified Convention No. 169,11 and the U.N. 
8. The most well-known indigenous claims are those of the Sami of Scandinavia, the northern 
peoples of Russia, the Inuit of Greenland, and the original peoples of the French Overseas 
Territories. Regarding the Sami, see Bankes, Nigel & Koivurova, Timo, eds., The Proposed 
Nordic Saami Convention. National and International Dimensions of Indigenous Property 
Rights, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2013; Borchert, Nanna, Land is Life: Traditional Sámi Reindeer 
Grazing Threatened in Northern Sweden, online: http://www.sametinget.se/6816 Kenyon 
Fields ed. 2001. Rovaniemi Declaration, 2008 at http://www.saamicouncil.net/?deptid=2161. 
Regarding the Amerindians of Guyana, see Tiouka, Felix, “Adresse au gouvernement et au 
peuple français, 9 décembre 1984” in Ethnies, (1–2) 1985 pp. 7–10; Menget, Patrick & Razon, 
Jean-Patrick, Guyane : le renouveau amérindien, Ethnies no 31–32, Peuples autochtones et 
développement : Survival international, Paris 2005. Regarding the Kanaks of New Caledonia, 
see Declaration by the Kanak Indigenous People of August 9, 2007, in particular paragraphs 3 
and 5(a), at http://www.bio-logiques.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=102:nouvelle-caledonie-declaration-du-peuple-kanak&catid=85:declarations&Itemid=478. 
See also Saihu, Dick, Déclaration De Gatope-Vook Du 08 Août 2009, Du Peuple Kanak, at 
http://www.gitpa.org/Peuple%20GITPA%20500/GITPA%20500–7ACTUsept09cndpa.pdf; 
Boanemoi, Julien, Déclaration de Monsieur Julien BOANEMOI sénateur coutumier de l’aire 
Ajie-Aro. Devant la 4ème Commission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, 63 ème ses-
sion (9 October 2008), translation in English available here : http://overseasreview.blogspot.
fr/2008/11/un-asked-to-monitor-decolonisation-in.html.
9. Revised I.L.O. Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, 27 June 1989, I.L.O. Official Bulletin, Vol. 72, Series A, No. 2 (entered into force: 
5 September 1991), http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C169.
10. G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (entered into force 13 September 2007), 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf.
11. To this date it has been ratified by four European countries: Denmark, Spain, Norway, and 
the Netherlands.
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Declaration, although widely supported in Europe,12 does not have the legal status 
of a treaty; indeed, its legal effect is a matter of some debate.13 And therein lies the 
practical interest of this paper’s objective, which is to determine whether the general 
human rights regime flowing from the ECHR can be used to support the recogni-
tion and protection of the ancestral land rights of the indigenous peoples of Europe.
The main focus of our analysis is the right to enjoy possessions guaranteed 
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention.14 In the first part 
of this article we will show how international human rights law has recently de-
veloped a doctrine of ancestral indigenous property rights that departs from the 
colonial legacy because it is premised on the equality of indigenous and Western 
legal cultures. In the second part, we will argue that this pluralistic and decolo-
nized property doctrine can and should be imported into the ECHR system so 
as to achieve, particularly through Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, a more effective 
protection of indigenous land rights in Europe.
2. Ancestral Indigenous Property in International 
Human Rights Law
Since the late 20th century the trend in international law has favoured the gradual 
decolonization of the legal status of indigenous peoples. International law is in-
voked with increasing frequency to challenge the hierarchical representation of 
legal cultures espoused by colonial thought, and a new understanding of claims to 
ancestral rights over traditional indigenous lands is currently emerging through 
the principle of recognition, which revives non-Western legal traditions as a source 
of indigenous land rights. Official state law is no longer the only means of deter-
mining the existence and scope of first peoples’ rights over their traditional lands. 
Now, even under general human rights instruments, states can be compelled to 
12. Among European countries only Russia has abstained, citing the “lack of balance in the text” 
which received “additions on the political unity of sovereign and independent States”, and 
deeming that the provisions concerning rights over land and natural resources and the right 
to compensation created problems. The representative from France celebrated its adoption 
of the Declaration, while noting that, according to the principle of the indivisibility of the 
Republic, collective rights could not prevail over individual rights http://daccess-dds-ny.
un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/504/65/PDF/N0750465.pdf?OpenElement.
13. See Anaya, James S., International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples, Aspen Publishers, 
New York 2009 at pp. 79–105.
14. The focus of this article is thus more specific than Koivurova’s recent study, which reviews 
all potential indigenous rights issues revealed by the European Court’s jurisprudence. See 
Koivurova, supra note 1, at 1.
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recognize pre-existing land tenure created under indigenous legal orders, a source 
that is both prior to and external to state law.
2.1 The Gradual Recognition of Ancestral Indigenous Title in 
International Law
The first explicit statement of the principle of recognition in contemporary in-
ternational law is in Article 11 of I.L.O. Convention No. 107, dated June 26, 1957, 
on indigenous and tribal populations (also known as the Convention concerning 
the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal 
Populations in Independent Countries). This provision states that “[t]he right of 
ownership, collective or individual, of the members of the populations concerned 
over the lands which these populations traditionally occupy shall be recognised.” 
The source of the land tenure this provision refers to is traditional indigenous oc-
cupation. Consequently, state law does not create or confer the said ownership, 
but merely recognizes it as it exists in the indigenous legal tradition, which may 
generate group rights that differ from the Western model of individual ownership. 
The originality of this type of “ownership” is apparent: it is both formally and 
substantively autonomous from the law of the state, from which it distinguishes 
itself by its sources and its attributes.
Article 14 of I.L.O. Convention No. 169, an instrument drafted to update interna-
tional norms relating to indigenous peoples, validated recognition as a way to con-
firm an autonomous and pluralist indigenous property regime in international law. 
It states that “[t]he rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned 
over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognised.” Moreover, 
under Article 13, states have the obligation to respect the cultural and spiritual 
value of the land for indigenous peoples, as well as the “collective aspects” of their 
land tenure system. The increased autonomy of indigenous land tenure in rela-
tion to state law and the Western notion of ownership is also confirmed through 
the explicit and systematic recognition in Convention No. 169 of indigenous legal 
systems, which the states can no longer ignore.15 The U.N. Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples also contains several provisions requiring states to respect 
pre-existing land rights under indigenous legal systems.16 Article 26, in particular, 
clearly enunciates the right of indigenous peoples to have their “traditional owner-
ship or other traditional occupation” of land recognized and protected. It adds that 
15. Subject to respect for the fundamental rights of indigenous individuals, see Convention No. 
169, Article 8, supra note 8.
16. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Articles 25–30, supra note 9.
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“such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to the customs, traditions 
and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.”
The confirmation of the principle of recognition – and thus of indigenous land 
rights as both ancestral and autonomous – is of critical legal importance, as it 
entrenches rights that are to be received by the state because they existed prior to 
its control over the territory. Consequently, proof of a grant, title, or confirma-
tion under state law is not required as a precondition to the protection of these 
indigenous land rights in international law. The mere fact that a state’s legal sys-
tem has always denied these rights, deeming that they have never existed or that 
they were extinguished from the outset by the imposition of state ownership, can 
no longer justify their exclusion from protection under international law.17 In the 
eyes of international law, the colonial failure to recognize pre-existing rights has 
not effected their extinguishment.
Therefore, ancestral property exists and is protected under international law, 
even when the claim has no basis under state law. Because ancestral rights existed 
at the time of colonization, they need not be acquired under state law. By removing 
the need to rely on the state’s legal regime, the confirmation by international law of 
the continued existence of pre-colonial tenure overturns centuries of internaliza-
tion of indigenous claims. The only way ancestral rights could have disappeared 
after the state’s assertion of sovereignty is if the indigenous peoples willingly aban-
doned them or if they were subject to a specific expropriation or displacement 
measure in compliance with international law. Similarly, interrupted or intermit-
tent presence on traditional land due to changes in the indigenous way of life does 
not defeat a claim. It cannot be inferred from such a situation or from a lack of 
Western-style development of the land, that there was a clear intention on the part 
of the indigenous community to permanently and completely sever their ancestral 
legal relationship with the land. Moreover, the intrusion of non-indigenous peoples 
onto indigenous lands does not defeat pre-existing, ancestral rights that have never 
been waived. In short, ancestral ownership confirmed through recognition may 
turn out to be more resilient than ownership derived from state law.
Even where state law confers on indigenous peoples certain rights over land 
and natural resources, ancestral indigenous property rights remain highly signifi-
cant, both symbolically and practically. For many indigenous peoples, the rights 
they hold directly from their ancestors, rather than at the pleasure of the state, 
are expressions of their indigeneity and their incontestable historical legitimacy. 
17. I.L.O., Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights in Practice: A Guide to I.L.O. Convention No. 
169, 94 (International Labour Organization 2009); Committee of Experts, 73rd Session, 2002, 
Observation, Peru at §7.
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Moreover, because it is neither created nor defined by state law, ancestral owner-
ship may contain rights that extend beyond what the state would deign to concede 
to its first occupants. States are generally concerned with confining indigenous 
peoples within spaces much smaller than their ancestral lands and with granting 
them only circumscribed rights of use, which are potentially more limited than 
the attributes of ancestral property.
It is true that, technically speaking, the recognition of indigenous property 
enshrined in Convention No. 169 is mandatory in only a small number of states18 
and that the UN Declaration is not in itself a formally binding instrument. On 
the other hand, one of the structuring principles of these documents – namely, 
the replacement of colonial Darwinism by an equality that respects indigenous 
legal difference – is fundamentally consistent with international human rights 
law. Therefore, specialized indigenous rights instruments do not formulate an 
exceptional legal doctrine but rather embody a general rejection of racial discrimi-
nation.19 Now that international law admits that non-discrimination may require 
culturally differential treatment,20 states that have not ratified the I.L.O. conven-
tions but are party to universal and regional human rights instruments will likely 
find it increasingly difficult to reconcile these commitments with the denial of the 
ancestral rights of the indigenous peoples living on their territories.
As is explained in the next section, the decolonization of indigenous property 
is increasingly taking place under widely ratified general human rights instru-
ments, spurred on by the ever more widespread understanding of international 
human rights conventions as an interdependent normative network, as opposed 
to a collection of air-tight legal silos. Indeed, it appears that international human 
rights law is all the more hospitable to the notion of ancestral indigenous property 
because it is able to combine the non-discrimination principle with the general 
protection of property rights.
18. To this date twenty states have ratified Convention No. 169, supra note 8.
19. As Anaya writes, “the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations was in fact 
the point of departure for the surge in of U.N. activity concerning indigenous peoples over the 
last few decades”: Anaya, James S., Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2nd ed., Oxford 
University Press, New York 2004 at p. 130.
20. See Henrard, Kristin, “The Protection of Minorities Through the Equality Provisions in the 
UN Human Rights Treaties: The UN Treaty Bodies” in International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights, (14) 2007 pp. 141–180; Thornberry, Patrick, “Confronting Racial Discrimination: 
a CERD Perspective” in Human Rights Law Review, (5) 2005 pp. 239–269.
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2.2 The Incorporation of Ancestral Indigenous Property 
Rights into General Human Rights Law
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly 
in 1948, states that “[e]veryone has the right to own property alone as well as in 
association with others” (Article 17) and that “[e]veryone is entitled to all the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind” 
(Article 2). The reference to the protection of joint or collective tenure indicates that 
this founding charter can accommodate a pluralistic interpretation of property. 
These provisions inspired the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, a U.N. treaty ratified by the vast majority of states. 
Under Article 5 (v) of that instrument, the states parties agree to eliminate all 
forms of discrimination in the exercise of the “right to own property alone as well 
as in association with others”. Similarly, all the important regional human rights 
instruments protect property rights while proscribing racial and ethnic discrimi-
nation in the recognition and implementation of this right.21Although the U.N. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not necessarily compel 
the recognition of original, pre-colonial collective property rights over land and 
resources, the Human Rights Committee interprets Article 27 of the Covenant, 
which sets out the rights of individuals belonging to minorities, as obliging states 
to recognize and respect the sense of identity that indigenous peoples feel in con-
nection with their traditional lands.22
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, for its 
part, has found that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination compels states to recognize a range of systems of land tenure that 
vary according to the specific and collective relationship that indigenous peoples 
21. See Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 24 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, and Article 3 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights.
22. See Scheinin, Martin, “Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights Under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights”, online: Torkel Oppsahls minneseminar 2004 http://www.galdu.
org/govat/doc/ind_peoples_land_rights.pdf; Eide, Asbjørn, “Rights of Indigenous Peoples - 
Achievements in International Law During The Last Quarter of a Century” in Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law, (37) 2006 pp. 186–212. See also the views of the Human Rights 
Committee on French Polynesia, CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1 of 29 July 1997. The Committee 
accepted a broad definition of family and found that the construction of a hotel complex on the 
site of an ancestral burial ground constituted an interference with the family life and private 
lives of the indigenous authors. The Committee did not rule on the foundations of Article 27 
because of France’s Statement regarding this article. See also the findings of inadmissibility, 
October 23, 2000, CCPR/C/70/D/822/1198, in a similar dispute in New Caledonia.
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traditionally maintain with “their communal lands, territories and resources”.23 
The Committee, taking into account the multiplicity of potential relationships with 
land, refers to “lands and territories traditionally owned or otherwise inhabited 
or used”. Adopting the logic of indigenous rights instruments, the Committee 
applies the principle of recognition that forms the basis of the ancestral and au-
tonomous tenure of indigenous peoples. Thus the Committee is of the view that 
the traditional occupation and use of these territories and resources by indigenous 
peoples grounds their rights under the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination. In its observations to the states, it concluded not only 
that the lack of recognition of these rights in a state’s legal system is not a bar to 
the application of the Convention, but also that this lack in fact constitutes a vio-
lation of the Convention.24 The non-discrimination principle forbids states from 
ignoring the ancestral rights of indigenous peoples flowing from their traditional 
occupation of territories in accordance with indigenous custom. The failure to 
recognize such rights is discriminatory because it denies the specific identities of 
these peoples as defined by their connection with their land.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has gone even further in trans-
posing the distinctive aspects of indigenous land rights into the substantive 
property rights set out in a general human rights instrument, specifically, the 
American Convention on Human Rights.25 The case law of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights is founded on the premise of the equality of indigenous 
and Western legal cultures and the need for a pluralist definition of the property 
protected by Article 21 of the American Convention. Indigenous tenure, which is 
autonomous and cannot be reduced to categories of Western law, is protected by a 
provision stipulating that “[e]veryone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his 
property.” Therefore, the American Convention meets the universality requirement 
by acknowledging the equal value of ancestral indigenous systems of communal 
and lineal property.26 The egalitarian treatment of indigenous legal traditions un-
23. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation XXIII 
(51) on the rights of indigenous peoples, adopted by the committee during its 1235th meeting 
on August 18, 1997.
24. See UNCERD, Consideration of Reports submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the 
Convention, Concluding Observations on Suriname, §11 (case file of appendices to the rep-
resentatives’ brief, appendix 4.2, folios 1487).
25. See generally, Pentassuglia, Gaetano, Minority groups and judicial discourse in international 
law: a comparative perspective, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers ed., Boston, 2009 at pp. 74–83.
26. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua (31 August 2001), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(Ser. C) No. 79 at §§146 and 149 [hereinafter Mayagna].
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der international human rights law is clearly presented by the Court as one of the 
very foundations of a pluralist notion of property:
This notion of ownership and possession of land does not necessarily conform 
to the classic concept of property, but deserves equal protection under Article 21 
of the American Convention. Disregard for specific versions of use and enjoyment 
of property, springing from the culture, uses, customs, and beliefs of each people, 
would be tantamount to holding that there is only one way of using and dispos-
ing of property, which, in turn, would render protection under Article 21 of the 
Convention illusory for millions of persons.27
By invoking the property rights of indigenous community members under com-
munal land tenure systems, these decisions also defuse the oft-asserted antago-
nism between collective rights and individual rights, recognizing that individual 
rights may exist within a collective tenure regime and that it would therefore be 
discriminatory to deny individuals the protection of their land rights because they 
are derived from communal title specific to indigenous legal culture.28
To justify this decolonization of property under international law, the Inter-
American Court relies in particular on Article 29(b) of the Convention, whereby 
that instrument may not be interpreted more restrictively than a state’s domestic 
law or any other international convention to which the state is party.29 This clause, 
which urges a coordination between regional and universal human rights norms, 
has permitted readings of the leading U.N. instruments favourable to collective 
indigenous tenure to be imported into the Inter-American system.30 This approach 
has also loosened the grip of domestic law on international law. Thus, in Saramaka 
v. Suriname, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights very explicitly stated that 
Suriname, which had ratified the U.N. instruments, was violating the Saramaka’s 
right of property recognized in Article 21 of the Convention, even though the col-
lective rights in the lands and resources claimed by the Saramaka people had no 
basis in the domestic law of that state.31
27. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (29 March 1996), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. 
C) No. 146 at §120. See also Xakmok Kasek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (24 August 
2010) at §87.
28. Consider the remarks of Judge Sergio Garcia Ramirez in Mayagna, supra note 25, at §14.
29. Article 29 of the American Convention reads as follows:No provision of this Convention shall 
be interpreted as:…(b) restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recog-
nized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one 
of the said States is a party… .
30. Saramaka People v. Suriname (28 November 2007) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 172 at 
§§93–96.
31. Id. at §§97–107.
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The international protection of ancestral indigenous lands has also been upheld 
by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in its recent decision 
in Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya,32 In particular, the Commission relies on 
sources of international law relating to indigenous peoples to broaden the notion 
of property protected by Article 14 of the African Charter to include collective 
indigenous tenure and establish it as an autonomous regime in international law 
which supersedes national legal definitions.33
We may therefore conclude that there is a convergence of opinion in interna-
tional human rights law regarding the recognition and protection of ancestral 
indigenous land rights that acknowledges their prior existence and the historical 
fact of colonial racism. This emerging consensus is due in part to cross-fertilization 
and dialogue between courts and monitoring bodies taking place at both domestic 
and supranational levels. Indigenous claims have been received favourably in vari-
ous international forums because, among other things, some courts or monitoring 
bodies have influenced the reasoning of others, guided them towards the relevant 
provisions in the instruments, and legitimized their decisions.34
A similar dynamic is apparent within the system established by the ECHR, 
where the ECtHR is central to the trans-judicial network of interpretation of fun-
damental rights. As we shall demonstrate below, this constitutes one of the ar-
guments in favour of recognizing ancestral indigenous tenure in European hu-
man rights law by strengthening the autonomy of the property regime under the 
European Convention.
3. Towards the Decolonization of Property in European 
Human Rights Law
The current movement in international law towards the recognition of indigenous 
land rights has not left Europe on the sidelines. Indeed, this movement involves 
32. Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on 
behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya (4 February 2010), Communication 276/2003, 
AC.H.P.R., 27th Activity Report covering activities from June to November 2009 [hereinafter 
Endorois].
33. Id. at §185.
34. Thus, the use by the Inter-American Human Rights Court of I.L.O. Convention No. 169 and 
U.N. treaties is one example among many of normative “imports” relating to the protection 
of rights and freedoms that is regularly carried out by the Court to enrich its case law and 
increase its legitimacy. See Neuman, Gerald, “Import, Export, and regional Consent in the 
Inter-American Court of Human rights” in The European Journal of International Law, (19) 
2008 pp. 101–123 at p. 101.
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all European states parties to the leading U.N. instruments whose beneficiaries 
include indigenous peoples. For example, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racism, which, as noted above, compels the recogni-
tion and protection of ancestral indigenous rights including collective tenure to 
traditional lands, has been ratified by nearly all of the members of the Council of 
Europe.35 The Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has also 
made recommendations to European states regarding the protection of the rights 
of indigenous peoples to their lands and resources.36 In addition, the European 
Union is increasingly urging its partners to uphold the rights of indigenous peo-
ples37 and deliberations on the Draft Nordic Saami Convention are ongoing.38
Within the Council of Europe itself, the Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities39 has expressed its most seri-
ous concerns regarding the issue of indigenous land rights in the northern states.40 
The Committee’s recommendations reveal the existence of a real problem with re-
35. All the member states of the Council of Europe have ratified the Convention, and only 
Croatia, Estonia, Macedonia, Greece, Latvia, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, 
and Turkey have not recognized the jurisdiction of the Committee for the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination.
36. See the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendations 
No. 23: Indigenous Peoples (18 August 1997) 55th session; see in particular the remarks on 
Finland (§214) and Sweden (§338) in the Committee’s report for the year 2000, 56th session 
(6–24 March 2000) and 57th session (31 July–25 August 2000), General Assembly, 55th session, 
Supplement No. 18 (A/55/18); the observations on Finland (§405) and Norway (§481) in the 
Committee’s report for the year 2003, 62nd session (3–21 March 2003), 63rd session (4–22 
August 2003), 58th session, Supplement No. 18 (A/58/18); the remarks on Norway (§336), 68th 
session (20 February–10 March 2006), 69th session (31 July–8 August 2006), General Assembly, 
61st session, Supplement No. 18 (A/61/18); and the remarks on the Russian Federation (§374) 
and Sweden (§406) in the report for the year 2008, 72nd session (18 February – 7 March 2008), 
73rd session (28 July–August 2008), General Assembly, Supplement No. 18 (A/63/18).
37. Special provisions regarding the rights of the Saami people were included in the agreements 
whereby Sweden and Finland joined the Union. See also the joint declaration called “the 
European Consensus” which was adopted in 2005 by the Council, the Parliament and the 
Commission (2006/C 46/01, art. 101 and 103).
38. See Bankes & Koivurova, supra, note 7.
39. For an explanation and analysis of the functioning of this framework convention and its 
follow-up mechanism, see Benoit-Rohmer, Florence, “La Convention-cadre du Conseil de 
l’Europe pour la protection des minorités nationales” in European Journal of International 
Law, (6) 1995 pp. 573–597; Klebes, Heinrich, “The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention 
for the Protection of national minorities” in Human Rights Law Journal, (16) 1995 pp. 92–98.
40. Resolution CM/ResCMN(2007)1 on the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities by Finland (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 31 
January 2007 at the 985th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).
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spect to indigenous lands in Europe, as well as the obligation to remedy this prob-
lem. The ECtHR is in a position to acknowledge the significance of the European 
Committee’s concerns regarding the indigenous land issue, as illustrated in its 
recent decision addressing the situation of the Roma in the field of education.41
Indeed, once the ECtHR hears a claim specifically concerning ancestral indig-
enous rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which states that “[e]very natural or 
legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions”, it will be in a po-
sition to integrate the European Convention into the network of international norms 
protecting indigenous rights over ancestral lands. The Court will not be able to dis-
regard the work done on indigenous issues by U.N. treaty implementation bodies.42 
It will also benefit from an attentive reading of the case law of the Inter-American 
Court, which integrates ancestral indigenous tenure into property law for the pur-
poses of the American Convention on Human Rights. Indeed, the ECtHR already 
relies on the precedents of the Inter-American Court to confirm its reasoning in the 
interpretation of the ECHR, even though its reference to the American Convention, 
an entirely external instrument, can have no more than a persuasive weight.43
The ECtHR has in fact had the opportunity to hear cases involving indigenous 
claims to land and resources based on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European 
Convention, although none of these cases have required a determination of the 
central issue as to whether the notion of “possessions” includes the pre-existing 
ancestral tenure that flows from customary indigenous law but that is not recog-
nized under state law. As the following section explains, the applications in these 
cases were not framed in such a way as to require the Court to address this issue 
directly. Thus the Court has not had the occasion to test the limits of the autonomy 
of the property regime under the ECHR in the context of indigenous land rights.
41. D.H. and others v. The Czech Republic, No. 57325/00, [2007] ECHR 922 (13 November 2007) at 
esp. §200; Oršuš and others v. Croatia, No. 15766/03, [2010] ECHR 337 (16 March 2010) at 
esp. §160.
42. The Court refers frequently to the work of the U.N. Human Rights Committee: see Py v. 
France, No. 66289/01 (11 January 2005) at §63; Sejdovic v. Italie, No. 56581/00 (10 November 
2004) at §44; Mamatkooulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99 (4 February 
2005); Saadi v. United Kingdom, No. 13229/03 (29 January 2008).
43. Timurtas v. Turkey, No. 23531/94 (13 June 2000); Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, 
Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99 (6 February 2003); Maszni v. Romania, No. 59892/00 (21 
September 2006); Silih v. Slovenia, No. 71463/01 (9 April 2009).
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3.1 Indigenous Peoples before the European Court of Human 
Rights: the Unresolved Issue of Ancestral Property Rights
In some cases, the Court (or, when it existed, the Commission) did not address the 
merits of an indigenous land claim because it found the application to be inadmis-
sible for other reasons. In Könkäma and 38 other Saami villages v. Sweden,44 for 
instance, the Saami villages challenged the Swedish authority’s granting of hunt-
ing and fishing licenses to the entire population on reindeer grazing lands where 
the Saami claimed to hold exclusive hunting and fishing rights. These rights, they 
argued, while not recognized under Swedish law, flowed from their ancestral use 
of these lands. In the view of the Saami, authorizing hunting and fishing on the 
claimed lands constituted a violation of their rights under Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 to the Convention. The Commission, however, found this ground to be in-
admissible because the applicants had failed to exhaust all domestic remedies and 
to file the application before the Commission within the prescribed six months 
following the final national decision.45
Similarly, in Hingitaq 53 and others v. Denmark,46 the Court found that it did not 
have jurisdiction rationae temporis over the infringement of possessions alleged 
by the indigenous applicants. In that case, in the summer of 1953 members of an 
Inuit tribe of Greenland had been displaced and re-settled a few kilometres away 
from their native village in the district of Thulé because of an agreement between 
the United Sates and Denmark to build an airbase. The Inuit alleged that the land 
they had been deprived of was their “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1, due to their traditional occupation of this land since long before 
colonization by the Danes. The Court did not rule on this claim to ancestral title 
under the Convention, finding that the alleged violation by the Danish authorities 
fell outside the Court’s jurisdiction because the facts in dispute had taken place 
44. Könkäma and 38 other Saami villages v. Sweden, No. 27033/95, [1996] ECHR 79 (25 November 
1996) at 78 [hereinafter Könkäma].
45. Id. at 87.
46. Hingitaq 53 et al. v. Denmark, No. 18584/04 (12 January 2006).
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prior to the coming into force in Denmark of the European Convention (September 
3, 1953) and Protocol 1 to the Convention (May 18, 1954).47
G. and E. v. Norway, a case dating back to 1983,48 demonstrates that, when 
appearing before the national courts, indigenous applicants must file clear land 
rights claims based on evidence of ancestral occupation of the territory. In that 
case, two Saami went before the Commission to claim that the construction of a 
hydroelectric dam authorized by Norway violated their property rights because the 
work caused the loss of part of what they considered to be their traditional lands 
and thus contributed to undermining their unique way of life. It appears, however, 
that the applicants had not provided the national courts with sufficient proof of 
their precise legal connection with the flooded land, even though Norwegian law 
actually recognized a right to compensation for any form of expropriation due to 
the building of a dam. Consequently, the Commission found that the applicants 
had not established that they held any property right over the site of the dam.49
Admittedly, the Commission appeared in that case to be fairly resistant to the 
very notion that the traditional use of the land by the Saami – namely, for hunting, 
fishing, and reindeer grazing – could ground a claim for “possession” within the 
meaning of the Convention. The Commission was doubtful that the Saami could 
hold a property right in the disputed site in the “traditional sense of that concept”50 
although it was prepared to admit that the dam could affect their traditional way 
of life in the area concerned in a way that triggered the application of Article 8 of 
the Convention.51 We should note, however, that the Commission later clarified 
its views in Könkäma, stating unequivocally that the hunting and fishing rights 
claimed by the Saami “can be regarded as possessions within the meaning of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”.52 Thus this broad notion of property, encompassing 
47. Indeed, on page 18 of its decision, the Court characterized the facts surrounding the forced dis-
placement of the Inuit as “instantaneous acts” that were completed before the Convention and 
Protocol became legally applicable to the state of Denmark, even though the applicants alleged 
that the deprivation of their lands was a continuing violation. In contrast, other international 
bodies have tended to find this type of violation as continuing. For example, in the same case, 
the I.L.O. expert committee found that the violation was continuing (see docs GB. 277/1889 
and GB. 280/18/5, 1999). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has also favoured this 
approach (Moiwana village v. Suriname (15 June 2005), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 124).
48. G and E. v. Norway (3 October 1983) Eur. Comm’n. H.R. D.R 35.
49. Id. at 43–44.
50. Id. at 43.
51. Id. at 42–43. Regarding the protection of the way of life, see FARGET, Doris, “La protection 
juridique des modes de vie minoritaires et autochtones : analyse comparée des décisions de 
deux juridictions régionales” in Lex électronica, (13) 2008 pp. 1–35.
52. Könkäma, supra note 42, at 85.
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distinctively indigenous cultural and economic aspects, has been accepted by the 
Court, which has found that reindeer grazing, hunting and fishing rights fall under 
the notion of “possession” within the meaning of the Convention.53
Finally, in the most recent decision involving an indigenous property claim 
under Protocol No. 1, the rights invoked by the applicants were not in actual fact 
pre-existing ancestral property rights standing independently from any recogni-
tion by state law. In Handölsdalen Sami Village v. Sweden,54 the Court was asked 
to rule on the admissibility of the Swedish winter grazing case. In Swedish court, 
the Saami applicants had lost a trial in which they had sought recognition of tra-
ditional winter reindeer grazing rights on land belonging to private parties. Before 
the ECtHR, the applicants argued that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated 
because the right to use that they claimed was recognized under Swedish law and 
therefore constituted a possession under this provision.55 In particular, they argued 
that Sweden had violated the Protocol through a lack of precision in the domestic 
law defining the territory of their grazing area.
The Court ruled that the right to access private property for the purposes of 
reindeer grazing claimed by the Saami had no basis in Swedish law and that the 
argument based on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was therefore inadmissible. The 
Court found that because Swedish law required the national courts to determine 
whether the applicants had grazing rights on land belonging to private owners, the 
claim could not be characterized as an “existing right” or “existing possession”.56 
The applicants had to show that they had a claim “in respect of which the applicant 
can argue that he or she has at least a legitimate expectation of obtaining effective 
enjoyment of a property right”.57 According to the Court, such a legitimate expec-
tation can exist only if there is a sufficient basis in Swedish law and, in particular, 
in the decisions of the Swedish courts.58 The Court found that this requirement was 
not met because Swedish law assigns the courts the task of determining whether 
such a right exists and they had answered this question in the negative.59
In that decision, the ECtHR’s analysis focuses on the basis of the indigenous 
claim in Swedish domestic law. It should be noted, however, that the applicants 
did not develop an argument clearly grounded in the pre-existence of an ancestral 
53. Handölsdalen Saami Village and others v. Sweden, No. 39013/04 (3d sec.) [2009] ECHR 472 
(17 February 2009), decision of partial admissibility at §46 [hereinafter Handölsdalen 2009].
54. Id.
55. Id. at §47.
56. Id. at §§49–51.
57. Id. at § 48.
58. Id. at §52. On the concept of legitimate expectation, see below.
59. Id. at §§53–55, in particular §54.
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indigenous tenure that had continued to exist under international law regardless of 
whether it had been recognized or confirmed by Swedish law and Swedish courts. 
This may explain why the Court did not find that a possession or legitimate ex-
pectation of enjoyment of that possession could, in the specific case of indigenous 
peoples, have a legal basis outside of Swedish law. It therefore cannot be inferred 
from this decision that the Court has explicitly and definitively closed the door 
to indigenous land claims based on ancestral rights arising from customary in-
digenous law.
In the judgment on the merits in Handölsdalen,60 only the dissenting Judge 
Ziemele seemed to concern herself with the specific situation of the indigenous 
people. She referred to developments in international indigenous law, which she 
used to challenge the reasoning of the Third Chamber61 and, unlike the majority 
judges, concluded that the right to access to courts had been violated.62 In our opin-
ion she was correct to believe that developments in international law in indigenous 
matters are essential to understanding these land issues in Europe.
On the whole, while the main issue of the recognition of ancestral indigenous 
tenure may yet remain unresolved, the work done by the ECtHR is far from incon-
sistent with the advancement of indigenous rights in Europe. Indeed, indigenous 
peoples are being welcomed into the system established under the ECHR as the 
Court recognizes their entitlement to judicial protection and access to courts, a 
right which carries a special meaning in the context of the international protection 
of these groups.63 For example, indigenous groups – Saami villages, in particular – 
may allege that their right to respect for their property has been violated because 
“the rights designated in that Act [Reindeer Herding Act] can be exercised by a 
Saami only as a member of a Saami village”.64 In addition to including traditional 
indigenous activities within the notion of property for the purposes of Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1, the Court has also had the opportunity to recognize that the 
protection of the right to use conferred on the Saami under domestic law – a right 
attached to their way of life and their culture – is in the general interest, thus 
60. Handölsdalen Sami Village and Others v. Sweden, No. 39013/04 (3d sec.), [2010] ECHR 418 
(30 March 2010) [hereinafter Handölsdalen 2010]. The Court found that Article 6 §1 of the 
Convention had been violated because of the length of proceedings.
61. Dissenting opinion of Judge Ziemele, id. at §5.
62. Id. at §10.
63. Pentassuglia, supra note 24, at 150.
64. Könkäma, supra note 42, at §86. On the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights 
found that an association promoting Saami culture could not be characterized as a victim of 
a violation of the Convention because it had no responsibilities in the area of fishing, which 
were at issue in this case, and did not represent its members in such matters: Johtti Sapmelaccat 
R.Y. and Others v. Finland, No. 42969/98 (18 January 2005) ECHR.
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empowering the state to limit exclusive use of property by a private owner.65 It 
therefore cannot be denied that the Court is receptive to the collective aspect of 
indigenous rights and to the distinctive history of these peoples. This openness 
can only be confirmed by the significant progress of ancestral indigenous rights 
under international law.
Indeed, today the ECtHR is in a position to assess the developments that have 
taken place in international human rights law and to recognize the existence of 
ancestral indigenous rights based on the autonomous property rights protected 
under the European Convention.
3.2 Ancestral Indigenous Rights and the Autonomy of the 
Property Regime under the ECHR
It is now clearly established in European human rights law that the right to respect 
for one’s possessions in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is analyzed as an autonomous 
regime, that is to say, “as a way of creating an ius commune to compensate for the 
lack of precision of the terms in the Convention and the lack of homogeneity among 
national laws”.66 Indeed, the ECHR protects “possessions”, or “biens” in French, 
which are notions of sufficient breadth and imprecision to include the various 
concepts of property defined by the different legal orders and cultures of Europe. 
Depending on their specific traditions, Europeans have very diverse modes of ap-
propriation, from the common law notion of the commons to modern real estate 
capitalism, including the legacy left behind by the Soviet Union. The European 
human rights regime is able to apply the concept of property to situations that are 
characterized differently by the various legal traditions and, in this way, to har-
monize the obligations of the member states.
At the outset, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was conceived to protect property from 
arbitrary interference by the state.67 Accordingly, the provision does not guarantee 
65. In a case where an owner, whose property was located in an area where the Saami were au-
thorized under Swedish law to hunt elk, the Commission recognized that these rights could 
limit the property of others in accordance with the general interest (Halvar From v. Sweden, 
No. 34776/97 (4 December 1998) Eur. Comm’n H.R.)
66. Sudre, Frédéric et al., Les grands arrêts de la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme, Presses 
Universitaires de France, Paris 2003 at p. 35, [translation].
67. Ruiz-Fabri, Hélène, “The approach taken by the European Court of human rights to the 
Assessment of compensation for “regulatory expropriations” of property of foreign investors” 
in N.Y.U. Envtl L.J. , (11) 2002–2003 pp. 148–173 at pp. 148–150.
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future acquisitions;68 the notion of possession, for example, does not guarantee the 
right to inherit.69 Consequently, when deciding whether an applicant’s claim falls 
within the substantive scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the ECtHR must bal-
ance two imperatives: on the one hand, the autonomy of the European Convention 
and, on the other, the pre-existence of a form of property in the applicant’s as-
sets. One potential solution could have been for the Court to assign an actual 
definition to the term “possessions” or “biens” in international law, and then to 
verify whether the applicant’s situation corresponded to that definition. This is 
not what emerges from the case law, however;70 the autonomy of the Convention 
implies merely greater flexibility than domestic law in the legal characterization 
of the claims brought before the Court. The Court determines, on a case-by-case 
basis, whether Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is triggered, specifically “whether the 
circumstances of the case, considered as a whole, conferred on the applicant title 
to a substantive interest protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”.71
Consequently the Court has been receptive to an increasingly innovative in-
terpretation of the notion of possession, taking into consideration, inter alia, the 
facts of the very specific situation of the applicants, without limiting itself to the 
formal categories of domestic law. As a result some of the proprietary interests the 
Court has recognized have been characterized as “most peculiar legal interests”.72
The autonomy of the notion of possession means that the Convention can be 
used to protect a possession, or property, that is not formally characterized as 
such under domestic law, so long as the state provides substantive protection of 
this interest.73 It is sufficient that there be such a basis, even if it is revocable or 
precarious,74 even if the national judge who recognized it lacks the jurisdiction 
68. The European Court has on numerous occasions stated that “Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does 
not guarantee the right to acquire property”, as it did, for example, in Kopecký v. Slovakia, 
No. 44912/98, [2004] ECHR 446 (28 September 2004) at §35 [hereinafter Kopecký].
69. Marckx v. Belgium, No. 6833/74 [1979] ECHR 2 (13 June 1979), G.A.C.E.D.H. No. 42.
70. See Frigo, Manlio, “Peaceful enjoyment of possessions, expropriation and control of the use 
of property in the system of European convention on human rights” in Italian Y.B. Int’l L, 
(10) 2000 pp. 45–69 at pp. 45–49.
71. Beyeler v. Italy, No. 33202/96, [2000] ECHR 1 (5 January 2000) at §100 [hereinafter Beyeler].
72. Sudre et al., supra note 63, at 500, [translation].
73. With respect to autonomous notions, Professor Sudre et al. consider that [translation] 
“European judges opt for a ‘substantive’, not formal, concept of the notions to be determined, 
which enables them to go beyond the usual meaning that the notion at issue carries under 
national law, conferring on it a broad meaning.”: Sudre et al., supra note 63, at 37. In the same 
vein, see also Gasus Dosier und Fördertechnik Gmbh v. Netherlands (23 February 1995) ECHR.
74. Beyeler, supra note 68.
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to establish ownership rights,75 and even if the applicants have not sought formal 
recognition by the courts of their right to the possession.76 For example, as we have 
seen, the Saami right to use land for hunting and fishing granted by domestic law 
fell within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 because this interest existed 
under the state’s law, even though such usage did not necessarily meet the legal 
concept of possessions or property in domestic law.77
Moreover, a claim itself can be regarded as a possession if, even though there 
may be no material possession, the claim is certain, or there is a legitimate expec-
tation that a legal ownership right will be recognized under domestic law.78 Thus, 
generally speaking, the decisive element of a legitimate expectation resides in the 
existence of a “sufficient basis in domestic law, as interpreted by the domestic 
courts, for the applicant’s claim to qualify as an ‘asset’ for the purposes of Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1”.79 As is the case with an “existing” possession, however, protec-
tion under the Convention remains highly dependent on domestic law.
Finally, the Court has pushed the autonomy of the notion of possession even 
further by recognizing that a protected property interest can crystallize if a per-
son draws his or her economic resources and income from a possession, even if 
there is no legal connection under domestic law between the possession and the 
person concerned. The Court recognized this type of interest in Doğan and Others 
v. Turkey,80 in which the applicants had been forcibly evicted from their homes be-
cause of terrorist concerns and prevented from returning to their villages. Some of 
the applicants did not hold title to the land but were descendants of the owners with 
whom they had been living and cultivating the land. The Court agreed to apply the 
notion of “possessions” to the situation of the applicants, basing it on their eco-
nomic activities.81 It should be noted that the Court also included “unchallenged 
rights over the common lands in the village” among its reasons for recognizing a 
75. Papastavrou and others v. Greece, No. 46372/99, [2003] ECHR 168 (10 April 2003) at §§34–35.
76. The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, No. 13092/87; 13984/88, [1994] ECHR 49 (9 December 1994).
77. See Könkäma, supra note 42, at 12 et seq.
78. The rule is set out in a judgment from 1995: Pressos Compania Naviera SA and others v. 
Belgium, No. 17849/91, [1995] ECHR 47 (20 November 1995). But the notion of “legitimate 
expectation” in the context of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was used for the first time in Pine 
Valley Developments Ltd and others v. Ireland, No. 12742/87, [1991] ECHR 55 (29 November 
1991) at §51.
79. Kopecký, supra note 65, at §54. This is in fact the case on which the Court based its decision 
in Handölsdalen 2009, supra note 51.
80. Doğan and Others v. Turkey, No. 8803/02 [2004] ECHR 296 (29 June 2004) [hereinafter Doğan].
81. The Court explains this reasoning in Id. at §139.
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proprietary interest, thus implicitly recognizing the collective aspect.82 Therefore, 
the fact that this economic or subsistence property interest was not recognized 
under domestic law did not prevent the Court from regarding it as a possession 
distinct from the property right over the possession itself.
The growing autonomy of the property regime under the ECHR highlights 
an element that is essential to the recognition of ancestral indigenous property, 
namely, the exemption of applicants from the requirement to establish title or to 
have their rights over the claimed land formally recognized under domestic law. 
By definition, ancestral tenure derives from indigenous law that predates the state’s 
legal system and therefore its existence is in no way dependent on the grant of 
formal title by the state. The question that has yet to be addressed by the ECHR is 
whether the Convention imposes an obligation on the state to recognize ancestral 
title to traditional indigenous lands when, as is the case in Europe, domestic law 
has still not confirmed pre-colonial title.
In a number of cases unrelated to indigenous matters, the Court has identified 
various forms of recognition or tolerance83 under domestic law that are sufficient 
to crystallize a property interest in the use of land or resources. But the Court has 
not yet entirely disentangled itself from the will of the state, and this undoubtedly 
explains why, in Handölsdalen, the Saami did not claim ancestral rights wholly in-
dependent of any recognition or confirmation under Swedish law.84 The Court has 
yet to acknowledge that letting the state have the last word with regard to whether 
pre-colonial indigenous land rights should be recognized leaves the field wide open 
for the perpetuation of discriminatory colonial law doctrines and is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the ancestral character of those rights, the existence of which 
does not depend on the discretion or tolerance of government authorities.
The Court is a mere step away from rendering the notion of possession fully au-
tonomous for the benefit of indigenous peoples; all that remains is its interpretation 
of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR as imposing an obligation on European states to 
recognize the existence of ancestral tenure. In so doing, the Court would reconcile 
82. This is indeed what inspired the African Commission to say, “the ECHR have recognized that 
property rights could also include the economic resources and rights over the common land of 
the applicants” (Endorois, supra note 31, at §186). Therefore, the African Commission used this 
European decision as one of the justifications for recognizing ancestral indigenous tenure (see 
above), thus demonstrating how useful Doğan, supra note 77 can be to the indigenous cause.
83. The Court has on occasion ruled that tolerance with regard to otherwise unlawful land use 
may give rise to a protected patrimonial interest. See Oneryildiz v. Turkey, No. 48939/99 [2002] 
ECHR 496 (18 June 2002); Hamer v. Belgium, No 21861/03 (27 November 2007); Matos e Silva, 
Lda. and Others v. Portugal, No. 15777/89 [1996] ECHR 37 (16 September 1996); Depalle v. 
France, No. 34044/02 [2010] ECHR 385 (29 March 2010).
84. See Handölsdalen, supra note 51, at 14 et seq.
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the two imperatives in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1: (1) the autonomy that would en-
able all forms of property to be protected effectively and (2) the pre-existence of the 
possession, since ancestral tenure is based on the prior and continuous existence 
from pre-colonial time of a customary proprietary relationship between the land 
and indigenous peoples. Where there has been no specific measure of expropria-
tion, a possession is not lost merely because of the fact of colonization; under the 
European Convention, therefore, it should be recognized as an existing possession.
Another advantage of extending the autonomy of the property regime in this 
way would be the considerable progress it would represent towards the equal re-
spect of legal cultures, a value to which the Court cannot be indifferent. As other 
international bodies have demonstrated, a lack of recognition of the ancestral 
land rights of indigenous peoples constitutes a denial of the equality of cultures. 
Colonial states justified taking control of land by discriminating against civiliza-
tions that they deemed to be inferior because, according to Western legal systems, 
the culturally differentiated use by indigenous peoples indicated a lack of owner-
ship of or rights over the land. The only way to eliminate this type of discrimina-
tion is by decolonizing property – that is, by admitting that the relationship of 
indigenous peoples to the land can differ in nature and origin from the model of 
property as defined by the majority, and still yet be worthy of equal protection.
The spirit of equality animating the Convention is in fact embodied in the very 
idea of an autonomous regime. As we have seen, the autonomy of the notion of 
possessions has made it possible to place the various different legal cultures within 
the Council of Europe on an equal footing. This means that every applicant before 
the ECtHR receives equal treatment because the judges of that Court are recep-
tive to the applicant’s culture or legal system of origin, whatever form it may take. 
The Court is now in a position to expand the system of equal protection under the 
Convention irrespective of the applicant’s culture by recognizing the indigenous 
legal cultures forming the basis of ancestral title.
As the Inter-American Court has understood, this openness to indigenous legal 
difference implies that the indigenous group itself can be the holder of the ancestral 
possession. The property right thus recognized can be exercised by the indigenous 
individual only as a member of the indigenous community to which he or she 
belongs. It is true that the ECtHR has so far avoided making the Convention “an 
instrument at the service of group interests”.85 Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate 
to state that there is an inconsistency or conflict of principle between individual 
rights and group rights in the indigenous context. Indeed, the Inter-American 
85. Larralde, Jean-Manuel, “La Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme et la protection 
de groupes particuliers” in Rev. trim. dr. h., (56) 2003 pp. 1247–1274 at p. 1259, [translation].
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Court has found that it would be misguided, in the interest of preventing collec-
tive rights from prevailing over the individual, to reject group claims and thereby 
deprive indigenous individuals of the enjoyment of any of their ancestral rights.
Moreover, it is entirely possible to preserve individual rights in the context of 
group rights while simultaneously doing justice to indigenous peoples. Indeed, in 
Refah Partisi, the European Court noted the care that must be taken not to define 
individuals solely as members of their groups.86 It would not be acceptable to sub-
ject individuals to the rules of an indigenous community that unjustifiably infringe 
on individual rights and freedoms protected by the ECHR and international hu-
man rights law. International instruments do not grant communities rights over 
their members that would be incompatible with those members’ fundamental 
rights.87 By recognizing ancestral tenure, the Court would not be abdicating its 
role as guarantor of individual rights and freedoms because it would be required 
to ensure that the exercise of this tenure was subject to those rights. Moreover, as 
Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 makes clear, the enjoyment of a possession is in no 
way absolute; thus, the states may preserve their roles as guardians of individual 
rights and freedoms. Finally, the recognition of ancestral indigenous property 
would not open the floodgates to claims from other groups, since this solution is 
based on the specific historical circumstances of indigenous peoples, who have 
long been deprived of their rights over lands in a manner that today is considered 
to be discriminatory. International law has taken note of these distinctions arising 
from historical circumstance, and has initiated a remedial process of decoloniza-
tion. Europe should do the same.
4. Conclusion
The decolonization of property in the European human rights system is a neces-
sary step towards greater respect for indigenous legal cultures. Current develop-
ments in international law and European human rights principles can only move 
us closer to the recognition of ancestral land rights. Where the states lag behind, 
the ECtHR should urge them on.
Adopting this position, and thereby eradicating discrimination from the foun-
dations of the ECHR property regime, will create a solid basis for land manage-
ment regimes accommodating both indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. It will 
then fall to the ECtHR to consider the merits of any interference with the rights of 
86. Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 
and 41344/98, [2003] ECHR 87 (13 February 2003) (Gd. Ch.).
87. Article 8(2) of I.L.O. Convention No. 169 and Article 34 of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples subject indigenous custom to respect for human rights.
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indigenous peoples to the free enjoyment of their possessions.88 As it has already 
done in a number of cases, the Court will be required to assess, on a case-by-case 
basis, the balance of indigenous, general, and private individual property interests 
that has been struck by the states in their domestic legal systems. Even a decolo-
nized right to indigenous property may be subject to legitimate and lawful limits 
or deprivations. It will be up to the ECtHR to gauge the interference and determine 
the conditions under which a state can infringe upon indigenous land rights. These 
conditions may include a duty to consult the indigenous peoples prior to limiting 
their rights, or a duty to comply with the proportionality principle, or to respect 
any other condition found in evolving international norms regarding indigenous 
peoples. Once again, the solutions that various international bodies have found 
may provide useful inspiration to the ECtHR as it reflects on the steps to be taken 
in the decolonization of the relationship between states and the indigenous peoples.
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В этом исследовании рассматриваются потенциальные последствия 
происходящих событий в международном законодательстве в области 
прав человека, в отношении земельных претензий коренных народов по 
защите собственности в соответствии с Европейской конвенцией о правах 
человека. Авторы показывают, как, в связи с отходом от колониального 
права, в последнее время в международное законодательство по защите 
прав человека включаются учение предков коренных народов на право 
собственности на землю. Такое развитие событий, однако, пока не произошло 
в рамках действия Европейской конвенции. Авторы утверждают, что новый 
подход к деколонизации собственности может и должен быть принят на 
рассмотрение в Европейском суде по правам человека, в своем толковании 
статьи Протокола № 1 Европейской конвенции.
88. The interference with the right of property referred to in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the 
Convention is governed by three distinct yet complementary “rules”: substantive interference, 
interference through deprivation, and control of use. See Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 
No. 7151/75, [1982] ECHR 5 (23 September 1982) at §61. These three forms of interference 
must obey the principle of proportionality and be consistent with procedural protections so 
as not to constitute a violation.
